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Summary 
 
This issues paper serves as input to an expert meeting on climate change and disaster risk 
reduction to be held at FAO, Rome, 28-29 February 2008.  
 
It introduces the state of knowledge on climate change, with particular focus on the 
implications for food security. It then examines the implications of different conceptual 
frameworks for food security in the context of a changing climate, before introducing the 
interlinked fields of adaptation and disaster risk management. The paper briefly highlights 
financial and institutional architecture to address these challenges. It ends by prompting 
discussions in the expert group meeting around the policy issues relevant to FAO in achieving 
food security in a changing climate. These are summarised in the table below.  
 
 Short term  Medium term Long term 
Implementation  Disaster risk reduction  
Social protection  
Coping-oriented technology  
Water saving practices  
Focus on non availability 
aspects of food security  
Agriculture technology for 
adaptation  
Water planning and irrigation 
systems 
Weather-linked insurance 
mechanisms  
Livelihood diversification  
Assisted migration  
Expansion of agriculture into 
more favourable areas 
Research and 
information  
Climate change impacts data  
Food security and biofuels  
Accessing adaptation finance 
Building institutional adaptive 
capacity  
Assessing user data needs  
Efficiency of adaptation 
measures over time 
Burden of costs of adaptation  
Impacts of climate change on 
rising food prices and security  
 
Areas of more favourable 
agriculture conditions  
Financial systems for resource 
transfer  
Security and migration issues  
 
Institutions 
and 
partnerships 
Partnerships to work on food security beyond availability 
Linkages with CGIAR bodies  
Strengthening national institutional capacity for long term 
agricultural planning and agricultural extension (broadening scope 
beyond agriculture to disaster risk management) 
Links with emergency food bodies including WFP to integrate long 
term perspectives on chronic food shortages  
International architecture for 
regulating food security  
Trade, conflict, security, 
emergency,  and migration 
partnerships 
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1. The climate change challenge 
 
What is the evidence for climate change? 
In late 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released their Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4), drawing together the scientific evidence on climate change1. 
This report states unequivocally the manifold evidence that climate change is occurring. 
Global average air temperatures are rising, with eleven of the last twelve years (1995-
2006) ranking amongst the twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of global 
surface temperature. The 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) of 0.74oc is larger than the 
corresponding trend of 0.6oc (1901-2000) given in the Third Assessment Report (TAR), 
published in 2001. This trend for temperature increase occurs across the globe, and is 
slighter greater at higher northern latitudes. 
 
Although land surfaces have warmed faster, there is also evidence for rising sea levels 
consistent with warming of the oceans. Global sea level has risen since 1961 at an 
average rate of 1.8mm/yr and since 1993 at 3.1mm/yr, with contributions from thermal 
expansion, melting glaciers and ice caps, and the polar ice sheets. It is, as yet, unclear 
whether this latter faster rate is due to decadal variation of an increase in the longer-
term trend. The effects of climate change on precipitation patterns are more varied, with 
significant increases in eastern parts of North and South America, northern Europe and 
northern and central Asia in the period 1900-2005; but decreases in the Sahel, the 
Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia. Globally, the area affected 
by drought has likely increased since the 1970s. 
 
Other extreme weather events are also correlated in various ways with climate change. 
It is very likely over the past 50 years that cold days, cold nights and frosts have become 
less frequent over most land areas, and hot days and hot nights have become more 
frequent. It is likely that heat waves have become more frequent over most land areas, 
and the frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over most areas. There is 
also observational evidence of an increase in intense tropical cyclone activity in the 
North Atlantic since about 1970, although there no clear trend in the number of 
cyclones, and little evidence of similar increases elsewhere. 
 
There is more data than ever before to suggest that human activity is responsible for 
these observed changes in climate. The IPCC AR4 states that there is very high 
confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been warming. In 
contrast, changes in solar irradiance are estimated to have caused a much smaller 
warming effect (+1.12W/m2 compared with +1.6W/m2). Most of the observed increase 
in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to the 
observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. 
 
What are the projected future changes in climate? 
These observed changes in climate are likely to continue into the future. The IPCC AR4 
states that there is high agreement and much evidence that with current climate change 
‘mitigation’ policies and related sustainable development practices, global greenhouse 
gas emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades. Greenhouse gas 
emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and induce other 
changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would very likely be 
larger than those observed in the 20th century. A number of scenarios of socio-economic 
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development have been developed to help project the range of potential future climate 
change, depending on different patterns of fossil fuel use. For the next two decades a 
warming of about 0.2oc is projected for a range of these scenarios, after which potential 
increases vary with the scenario in question. 
 
As well as outlining the potential degree of warming, the Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) also has higher confidence in the projected patterns of warming, which will be 
greatest over land and at most high northern latitudes and least over the Southern Ocean 
and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean. There are very likely to be precipitation increases 
in high latitudes, compared with likely decreases in most subtropical land regions, 
continuing trends observed to date. The area under snow cover will continue to contract, 
leading to increases in thaw depth over most permafrost regions, and decrease in sea ice 
extent. Furthermore under some SRES scenarios Arctic late-summer sea ice is projected 
to disappear almost entirely by the latter part of the 21st century. 
 
Changing temperature and precipitation patterns will affect the geographical distribution 
of extra-tropical storm tracks, leading to a poleward shift and in turn reinforcing 
changes in wind, temperature and precipitation patterns. There will very likely be an 
increase in tropical cyclone intensity. The frequency of hot extremes, heat waves and 
heavy precipitation is also very likely to increase. This altered frequency and intensity 
of extreme weather events, including droughts, heat waves and floods, together with sea 
level rise, is expected to have mostly adverse effects on natural and human systems.   
 
IPCC AR4 concluded with high confidence that projected changes in the frequency and 
severity of extreme climate events will have more serious consequences for food and 
forestry production, and food insecurity, than will changes in projectedmeans of 
temperature and precipitation2. Since the IPCC Third Assessment Report in 2001, 
scientific confidence has increased that some weather events and extremes will become 
more frequent, more widespread and/or more intense during the 21st century; and more 
is known about the potential effects of such changes. Some of the projected impacts of 
the most likely changes by sector are outlined in Table 1.  
 
Nevertheless, AR4 also notes that much uncertainty remains of how changes in 
frequency and severity of extreme climate events with climate change will affect food, 
fibre, forestry, and fisheries sectors3. Projection of sub-regional impacts of extreme 
events is highly uncertain, and the complexity of assessing global impacts on food 
security is enhanced by uncertainty over the future role of agriculture in the global 
economy. Although most studies available for AR4 assume a rapidly declining role of 
agriculture in the overall generation of income, no consistent and comprehensive 
assessment was available.  
 
As a consequence, much work to date has focused on existing vulnerability and 
exposure. However, based on both modelling projections and understanding of current 
vulnerability to food insecurity, AR4 concludes that “climate change is likely to further 
shift the regional focus of food insecurity to sub-Saharan Africa. By 2080, about 75% of 
all people at risk of hunger are estimated to live in this region”4. However, the enhanced 
vulnerability of this region relative to Asia is noted to be largely independent of climate 
change and is mostly the result of the projected socioeconomic developments for the 
different developing regions5. This implies that food insecurity in a changing climate 
must tackle non climate-related risks and vulnerabilities.  
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Table 1: Projected major impacts by sector due to changes in climate and extreme 
weather events over the 21st century (not taking into account adaptive capacity)6 
Examples of major projected impacts by sector Phenomenon 
and direction of 
trend. 
Likelihood 
of future 
trends 
based on 
projections 
for 21st 
century 
using 
SRES 
scenarios 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
ecosystems 
Water resources Human health Industry, settlement and 
society 
Over most land 
areas, warmer 
and fewer cold 
days and nights, 
warmer and 
more frequent 
hot days and 
nights. 
Virtually 
certain 
Increased yields 
in colder 
environments; 
decreased yields 
in warmer 
environments; 
increased insect 
outbreaks 
Effects on water 
resources 
relying on 
snowmelt; 
effects on some 
water supplies 
Reduced human 
mortality from 
decreased cold 
exposure 
Reduced energy demand 
for heating;  increased 
demand for cooling; 
declining air quality in 
cities; reduced disruption 
to transport due to snow, 
ice; effects on winter 
tourism 
Warm 
spells/heat 
waves. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most land areas 
Very likely Reduced yields 
in 
warmer regions 
due to heat 
stress; increased 
danger of wildfire 
Increased water 
demand; water 
quality 
problems, 
e.g. algal 
blooms 
Increased risk of 
heat-related 
mortality, especially 
for the elderly, 
chronically sick, very 
young and socially 
isolated 
Reduction in quality of life 
for people in warm areas 
without appropriate 
housing; impacts on the 
elderly, very young and 
poor  
Heavy 
precipitation 
events. 
Frequency 
increases over 
most areas. 
Very likely Damage to 
crops; soil 
erosion, inability 
to cultivate land 
due to 
waterlogging of 
soils 
Adverse effects 
on quality of 
surface and 
groundwater; 
contamination of 
water supply; 
water scarcity 
may be relieved 
Increased risk of 
deaths, injuries and 
infectious, respiratory 
and skin diseases 
Disruption of settlements, 
commerce, transport and 
societies due to flooding; 
pressures on urban and 
rural infrastructures; loss 
of property 
Area affected by 
drought 
increases. 
Likely Land  
degradation; 
lower yields/crop 
damage and 
failure; increased 
livestock deaths; 
increased risk of 
wildfire 
More 
widespread 
water stress 
Increased risk of 
food and water 
shortage; increased 
risk of malnutrition; 
increased risk of 
water-and foodborne 
diseases 
Water shortage for 
settlements, industry and 
societies;  reduced 
hydropower generation 
potentials; potential for 
population migration 
Intense tropical 
cyclone activity 
increases. 
Likely Damage to 
crops; 
Windthrow 
(uprooting) of 
trees; damage to 
coral reefs 
Power outages 
Causing 
disruption of 
public water 
supply  
Increased risk of 
deaths, injuries, 
water- and foodborne 
diseases; 
post-traumatic 
stress disorders 
Disruption by flood and 
high winds; withdrawal of 
risk coverage in 
vulnerable 
areas by private insurers, 
potential for population 
migrations, loss of 
property 
Increased 
incidence of 
extreme high 
sea level 
(excludes 
tsunamis). 
Likely Salinisation of 
irrigation water, 
estuaries and 
freshwater 
systems 
Decreased 
freshwater 
availability due 
to 
saltwater 
intrusion 
Increased risk of 
deaths and injuries 
by drowning in 
floods; migration-
related health 
effects 
Costs of coastal protection 
versus costs of land-use 
relocation; potential for 
movement of populations 
and  infrastructure; also 
see tropical cyclones 
above 
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2. Conceptual frameworks for climate change, disasters and food 
security  
 
Climate change will have profound implications for food security across the globe, but 
these implications are far from clear and the causal pathways from changes in climate to 
changes in food security outcomes are complex and likely to vary from region to region. 
The examination of food security needs to consider the broader range of sectors and 
activities contributing to food production, including agriculture, fisheries and forests. It 
also requires increasing attention to urban and peri-urban areas rather than only a rural 
focus, as these areas become increasingly important areas for markets, storage and 
production as well as consumption.  
 
This section introduces three ways of analysing these linkages and pathways. No single 
conceptual framework is advocated, since each has its strengths and limitations, but they 
do share one feature that advances the analysis beyond conventional climate change 
modelling: they consider other impacts apart from the availability of food. 
 
2.1. Food security analysis 
 
The standard definition of food security used by the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
is a “situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and 
economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life”7. Food security analysis under these 
terms tends to have been based on a systems or livelihoods perspective and 
encompasses four main elements of food security – the availability, stability, utilisation 
and access to food. Climate change is likely to impact on all four of these elements, not 
just on availability. 
 
Availability of food 
The most direct impact of climate change on food security is through changes in food 
production. Short term variations are likely to be influenced by extreme weather events 
that disrupt production cycles. These more geographically heterogeneous impacts are 
difficult to predict with accuracy and have a bearing on the stability aspect of food 
security outlined below. Most assessments of the impacts of climate change deal with 
aggregate changes (gains and losses) in arable land, changes in actual and potential 
yields, and inter-annual variability of harvests. Climate change is projected to lead to 5-
170 million additional people being at risk of hunger by 20808, with this large range 
explained by the variations in different model outputs. The UK Hadley Centre’s 
HadCM2 and HadCM3 models, for example, suggest that climate change will lead to 
increased crop yields at high and mid latitudes, but decreased yields at low latitudes9. 
While initially the global food system may be able to accommodate such changes – 
because falling production in some regions could be offset by rising production 
elsewhere – these models estimate that about 80 million people will be at risk of hunger 
by the 2080s due to climate change impacts. Most of these food insecure people will be 
located in arid regions and the sub-humid tropics, particularly Africa, which is projected 
to suffer reductions in yields and decreases in production under both models. Later work 
by the same team refines these projections by running the models under various ‘SRES’ 
emissions scenarios and projected socio-economic scenarios10, thus adding greater 
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complexity to the analysis, but at the same time increasing the range of potential 
outcomes in terms of food insecure people. 
 
These models all agree that climate change impacts on the availability of food will vary 
geographically. Temperate regions in the high latitudes will see a slight increase in 
productivity due to extended growing seasons and expansion of area suitable for crops. 
Higher carbon dioxide concentrations may also have a positive influence on many 
crops, especially C3 crops such as wheat, rice and soybean; although conversely C4 
crops such as maize and sorghum will experience fewer positive effects. The popularity 
of these C4 food crops in southern Africa, in conjunction with the climate projections, 
contributes to a significant decrease in food availability. A recent meta-analysis of 
climate risks for crops in 12 food insecure regions based on statistical crop models and 
climate projections for 2030 from 20 global climate models shows that South Asia and 
southern Africa will suffer negative impacts on food crops that are important to food 
insecure populations, particularly if sufficient adaptation measures are not adopted11. 
 
One global simulation model concluded that the total amount of land available for 
cereals cultivation is likely to increase by some 9% by 2080, with the biggest gainers 
being the Russian Federation (+64%), Central Asia (+53%), North America (+41%) and 
northern Europe (+16%) (see Table 2).12 However, most of Africa – especially Southern 
Africa and North Africa, but also West Africa and East Africa – is projected to lose 
much of its current farmland, with highly damaging consequences for food security in 
the world’s most food insecure continent. Projected losses of cereal production potential 
in sub-Saharan Africa range from 33% by 2060 to 12% by 2080.13 Certain countries 
will be hit more than others: a disaggregated analysis of African agriculture concludes 
that three countries – Chad, Niger and Zambia – will lose “practically their entire 
farming sector” by the year 210014. 
 
Table 2. Projected impact of climate change on suitable land for cereals 
 Reference  
 1961–1990 Relative to reference 
Region (1,000 ha) 1990 2020 2050 2080 
North America 358,202  102 110 121 141 
Eastern Europe 124,935  103 101   96   96 
Northern Europe 45,462  101 109 113 116 
Southern Europe 38,524    98   94   94   91 
Western Europe 63,267  100   98   98   97 
Russian Federation 243,898  105 124 148 164 
Central America & Caribbean 51,505    99 105 109   99 
South America 653,060  102 104 105 102 
Oceania & Polynesia 115,310  102 102 102   88 
Eastern Africa 316,282    99   98 100   96 
Middle Africa 254,500  102 104 106 102 
Northern Africa 11,782  106   97 62   25 
Southern Africa 31,316    88   55   48   54 
Western Africa 178,095    99 101 100   96 
Western Asia 23,561  105 112   94 101 
Southeast Asia 97,831  100   98 103 104 
South Asia 189,132  101 101   99   97 
East Asia & Japan 149,694  102   99 108 110 
Central Asia 12,908  111 117 147 153 
Developed 993,529  102 110 119 128 
Developing 1,965,735  101 101 103 100 
World 2,959,264   101 104 108 109 
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Source: Fischer et al. 2002:64; regions projected to lose farmland are highlighted 
 
A key challenge for food security policy in highly affected countries – especially in 
Africa, where agriculture remains the dominant economic sector – is to determine 
whether (and for how long) to continue investing in agriculture as the main livelihood 
activity and source of food for the majority of the population, and when to switch the 
policy focus to diversification and facilitating viable exits from agriculture for those 
farmers whose livelihoods are directly compromised by these processes. 
 
 
Stability 
Although much scientific attention has been paid to the availability of food through 
modelling, relatively less is known about the stability of food supplies and its effect on 
food security. The stability element of food security refers to adequacy of food supplies 
“at all times” and to the potential for losing access to the resources needed to consume 
adequate food, since even a temporary disruption to food supplies or access can have 
fatal consequences. This may occur, for example, through failing to insure against 
income shocks or lacking the reserves to compensate for such shocks. 
 
Weather extremes and climate variability are the main drivers of food production 
instability, especially in rain-fed farming systems with limited irrigation. There remains 
little analysis of the impact of the changing frequency of extreme weather events on 
stability, particularly the interaction an the local level between relatively moderate 
impacts of climate change on overall agroecological conditions and much more severe 
climatic and economic vulnerability15. Already many areas, such as southern Africa, are 
accustomed to unpredictable and unstable harvests based on inter-annual climate 
variability, but even for these places the pace and projected levels of warming may 
expand, and rising frequency and intensity of extreme events such as droughts is likely 
to increase the instability of food production. Several models forecast not just higher 
average temperatures and lower rainfall in semi-arid regions, but increasing probability 
of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events, which have become “more frequent, 
persistent and intense since the mid-1970s”16. Other locations with formerly stable and 
predictable weather conditions may become subject to variability, contributing to 
emerging potential for food crises.  
 
Utilisation 
The third element of food security refers to the utilisation of food. Climate change will 
alter the conditions for food safety and use. Changing temperature and precipitation 
patterns will alter the ranges of vector, water- and food-borne diseases, such as cholera 
and diarrhoea. Projected increases in risk of flooding of human settlements, especially 
in coastal areas from both sea level rise and increased heavy precipitation, is likely to 
result in an increase in the number of people exposed to vector-borne (e.g., malaria) and 
water-borne (e.g., cholera) diseases. This in turn lowers their capacity to utilise food 
effectively, as when people are ill they are unable to use food effectively, thus 
compromising their status of food security. 
 
Populations in water-scarce regions are likely to face decreased water availability, 
particularly in the sub-tropics, with implications for food processing and consumption17. 
Changing climatic conditions also affect safe and storage. Increasing temperature, for 
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example, could increase the likelihood of food poisoning, especially in temperate 
regions. Although there has been much research on the health impacts of climate 
change, as with stability of food, this element of food security remains understudied to 
date. 
 
Access 
Arguably as important as the availability of food is access to food by all members of the 
population. This means that market conditions and considerations like political stability 
and the presence of civil strife are also important in determining access to food. It also 
serves to explain the seeming paradox between self-sufficiency and food security: while 
Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, are far from self-sufficient because their food 
production is constrained by limited land; they are food secure at both national and 
household levels because their populations derive access to food through other sources. 
Other countries (such as South Africa and the United States) are food secure at national 
level, but have members of their population suffering food insecurity due to poverty and 
failures of markets and social welfare systems. 
 
At the global level, lower food prices and rising incomes have led to improvements in 
food security, despite rapidly rising populations, as more and more people are able to 
access affordable food. Climate change, however, poses a threat to this positive trend, as 
regional and aggregate shifts in food production and availability will affect markets and 
commodity prices. Indeed, currently ‘soaring’ food prices suggests that this process 
might already have started. When food becomes scarce, due to a variety of factors 
including the impacts of weather related extreme events such as a drought or flood, or 
because of gradual processes of falling per capita food production, prices will rise. This 
affects both national economic performance (e.g. through impacts on agricultural 
exports) and household-level food security18.  
 
Access to and the development of markets for food, especially in remote rural areas, 
therefore remains a crucial response to enable greater food insecurity in the face of 
climate shocks and stresses. Access to food is also likely to be influenced by complex 
secondary impacts of climate change including conflict, human insecurity and 
migration. As with stability and utilisation, exploring the access element of food 
security under alternative climate change scenarios has been underrepresented in the 
academic literature to date. This is reflected in the poor level of citable literature in the 
AR4 report of the IPCC in 2007, which, while noting these lacunae, focuses on changes 
in food availability through modelling of gradual long term climatic changes.  
 
 
2.2. Entitlement analysis 
 
The ‘entitlement approach’ was developed by Amartya Sen, whose work on famines 
showed that rather than being caused by drought or flood and consequent crop failure, 
most famine mortality results from the inability of people to acquire food through either 
purchase or exchange, or transfers19. The entitlement approach is useful for our 
purposes because it draws analytical attention to other sources of food apart from 
production, and highlights the need for more empirical research and modelling on the 
likely effects of climate change on other components of local and national food systems. 
The distribution and reproduction of entitlements to food is determined by the 
livelihood system in the local economy, as well as structural factors in the local political 
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economy that construct ‘social vulnerability’ (e.g. gender)20. In Sen’s terminology, 
famine – or food insecurity – results from ‘entitlement failure’, which could occur in 
one or more of four domains: production, labour, trade or transfers. 
 
Production-based entitlement 
The projected impacts of climate change at the aggregate (global and regional) level 
have been discussed. The entitlement approach operates best at the micro-level of 
households or livelihood groups (e.g. farmers, landless labourers), often in combination 
with a livelihoods framework. An entitlements-based analysis of climate change would 
take account of differences in dependence on food production by different groups of 
households. For instance, farmers are most directly vulnerable to ‘failure of production-
based entitlement’ due to climate change, because they depend most heavily on crop 
production for both their food and their income. Poor farmers with undiversified 
livelihoods and few asset buffers are most vulnerable of all, because they lack 
alternative sources of food when their harvests fail.  
 
Labour-based entitlement 
When crop production is inadequate, farmers look for work to supplement their food 
and income, and the rural non-farm economy becomes an important determinant of 
household food security, through its capacity to generate ‘labour-based entitlement’ to 
food. Apart from farmers, other groups that depend indirectly on agriculture for their 
living are also vulnerable to a collapse of demand for their services – such as landless 
labourers. (Sen labelled this effect ‘derived destitution’.) One plausible consequence of 
climate change is that pressure on rural labour markets will increase, and if the supply 
of labour rises while demand for labour is constant or falling, real wages will fall, 
exacerbating food insecurity in poor rural communities. Another ‘second round’ 
consequence of climate change could be an increase in labour migration out of areas 
where food production is more variable and employment opportunities are falling, with 
unpredictable implications for household food security that require detailed context-
specific analysis and modelling. 
 
 
Trade-based entitlement 
‘Trade-based entitlement’ describes the ability to convert income or assets into food 
through purchase or exchange. In rural areas, farmers and pastoralists already face 
falling terms of trade during climate-triggered food crises when they convert their assets 
(such as livestock) into food – excess supplies of assets on local markets drives asset 
prices down, while excess demand for food pushes food prices up, until the poor are 
priced out of the market for food and face starvation. Urban residents and others who do 
not grow their own food are likely to feel the effects of climate change indirectly, 
through rising prices in places where food availability is falling or more unstable. To 
some extent, the relative affluence and political influence of urban consumers, plus 
increasingly interconnected global markets, might insulate urban residents against 
negative shocks and processes affecting food production even within their own country: 
food can always be imported. It is notable that even during major famines, cities are 
rarely affected. Here again, the entitlement approach highlights the importance of an 
analysis disaggregated both geographically (within as well as between countries) and by 
livelihood system. 
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Transfer-based entitlement 
The final legal source of food is ‘transfer-based entitlement’, which describes all gifts or 
donations (including food aid) from others. Informal transfers are provided by extended 
families and communities (‘informal social security systems’, patronage networks, the 
‘moral economy’), but are vulnerable to covariate shocks. If climate change undermines 
agricultural production in a farming community, the capacity of local residents to 
support each other will be compromised and the scale of informal transfers can be 
expected to contract. Formal transfers are provided by governments and donors, and 
range from humanitarian relief during emergencies to institutionalised social welfare 
systems that deliver regular cash transfers to ‘vulnerable groups’ (such as pensioners). 
A ‘best bet’ prediction is that climate change will place increased demands on the 
international relief system to fill domestic food gaps with emergency food aid, as well 
as increasing the caseload of chronically food insecure people who need longer term 
social assistance, in the form of regular food aid or cash-based safety nets. Given the 
likelihood that food production will be undermined most in countries that are already 
poor and food insecure, this scenario implies a declining capacity of governments in the 
worst affected countries to deliver food security for their citizens, and an increasing role 
for the international community in underwriting food security in these countries. 
 
The application of entitlements analysis for climate change to date have central in 
balancing conceptions of biophysical vulnerability with attention to the social 
determinants of people’s vulnerability to changes in climate conditions, particularly 
extreme events and natural disasters21. In doing so, it has helped shift the debate on 
disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation away from solutions based only on 
technology or factors directly related to climate and towards a more comprehensive 
approach to tackling climate change and development.  
 
 
2.3. Vulnerability analysis and assessment 
 
Reducing vulnerability provides another possible framework and focus of activity. It is 
already becoming a unifying framework for the climate change adaptation and disaster 
risk management communities in a development context, and underpins a toolkit for 
targeting and assessment. Vulnerability analysis moves beyond equating vulnerability 
with exposure to a hazard, towards examining how vulnerability is determined by a 
wide range of social factors affecting sensitivity to shocks and stresses and ability to 
bounce back and adapt over time (Figure 1). It is therefore a prerequisite to the trend to 
move away from disaster response to disaster preparedness. Reducing vulnerability 
therefore requires an understanding of the dynamic play of multiple driving forces. 
 
Vulnerability remains a highly debated concept, with origins in natural hazards, poverty 
and food security literature. Application to climate change impact assessments and 
disaster risk reduction has come more recently. A variety of definitions have been 
proposed22, but a recent definition from the adaptation community usefully captures 
vulnerability as the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated 
with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt23.  
 
Vulnerability can be defined as:  
The state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with 
environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt 24.  
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Figure 1: Vulnerability: Moderating the risk of negative impacts from natural 
hazards25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A meta-analysis of vulnerability definitions reveals a distinction in the literature 
between different epistemological approaches26. The natural hazards school of thought 
focuses on the objective study of a given hazard, emphasizing the exposure of an 
ecosystem to the hazard. This might be termed biophysical vulnerability. In contrast, the 
human ecology and political economy schools of thought emphasise a particular group 
or social unit of exposure, and especially to the social, economic and political 
institutions that render them vulnerable or not. This might be termed social 
vulnerability. 
 
The change in conceptual thinking over time has been reflected in changing 
methodologies of vulnerability assessment27. Biophysical vulnerability is based on a 
more static, linear relationship between hazard and impact, and vulnerability refers to 
the sensitivity of natural environments to projected changes in climate28. Many such 
biophysically focused vulnerability assessments have been carried out for climate 
change impacts on different ecosystems and sectors on a case study basis, including 
coasts29, rivers/water resources30, forests31, wetlands32, and agricultural productivity33.  
 
The focus on biophysical vulnerability has been critiqued by social scientists because it 
assumes that humans are passive recipients of impacts, and thus fails to capture their 
dynamic ability to mediate such hazards, either through resisting an event or coping 
once it occurs34. A focus on social vulnerability addresses this by recognizing that 
exposure to physical phenomena is embedded in, and mediated by, the particular human 
context (social, economic, political, institutional) in which they occur. Whilst physical 
phenomena are necessary for the production of a natural hazard, their translation into 
risk and potential for disaster is therefore contingent upon human exposure and a lack of 
capacity to cope with the negative impacts that such exposure might bring to individuals 
or human systems35.  
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Understanding the impacts of climate change is thus inextricably linked with the human 
conditions that create a resilience or vulnerability to that event36. Vulnerability analysis 
helps move food security and climate change debates beyond food production alone. 
This understanding also highlights a shift in focus from which places are vulnerable, 
towards a focus on who is vulnerable and where they are located. Vulnerability is 
differentiated on the basis of age, ethnicity, class, religion and gender (see box 1)37. 
 
Box 1: Gender and vulnerability 
Socio-cultural constructions of gender roles can affect the vulnerability of women and men 
differentially, as well as their capacity to adapt to climate change. Much research has 
documented the greater vulnerability of women to livelihood shocks, including climate-related 
hazards, reflecting their subordinate positions within largely patriarchal societies38. Women in 
low-income countries are heavily involved in climate-sensitive activities such as agriculture39. 
This means that climate change impacts will affect women directly and disproportionately 
through changes in agriculture productivity, water, vegetation and fuelwood availability and 
changes in the health environment, since women bear the brunt of household care.  
 
Women’s vulnerability and lack of adaptive capacity is also exacerbated by their insecurity of 
property rights40. Formal land and water rights for example are heavily gendered, with 
implications both for vulnerability and for capacity to adapt productive livelihoods to a 
changing climate. Increasing pressure on resources may disrupt informal systems that have 
operated to overcome gender inequality in property rights41. 
 
Evidence from disasters such as hurricane Mitch in 199842 and the Asian tsunami of 200443 
reveals how certain groups are more vulnerable to extreme events. Home-based children and 
the elderly are more likely to be injured or killed by extreme hazards event. Women are at 
increased risk of domestic violence and sexual abuse, and often assume a disproportionate 
amount of the burden during rehabilitation periods, due to temporary housing structures and 
camps, their pivotal roles in the reproductive sphere44, and likelihood of having economic 
activities based in or around the home45.  
 
There have been calls for greater recognition of gender rather than focusing exclusively on 
the vulnerability of women. This widens analysis to include men’s vulnerabilities, gender 
aspects of mitigation and helps emphasise women’s adaptive capacity46. Emerging evidence 
on how gender identity and subjectivity are reconstructed during post-disaster recovery47 
highlights the need to further develop vulnerability studies to incorporate more nuanced 
understandings of the role of gender. 
 
Tools and methods for vulnerability assessment 
 
The different conceptions of vulnerability (biophysical and social) have led to a variety 
of tools and methods used in assessing the status of vulnerability within the climate 
change and disasters fields. Typically within biophysical vulnerability attempts have 
tended to focus on the top-down modeling of global impacts (sometimes by sector, eg 
water, health etc); whilst proponents of social vulnerability tend to take a more bottom-
up approach focused around place-based case studies. On a global scale, comparative 
indicators facilitate a systematic assessment of the nature of vulnerability48, whilst on a 
local scale place-based approaches are still popular. As it is methodologically 
impossible to apply theoretical frameworks across scales of analysis, due to the scale 
specificity of the manifestations of vulnerability (even if driving forces are similar)49, 
indicators and place-based approaches remain two of the most popular tools.   
 
Indicators are quantifiable constructs that provide information either on matters of wider 
significance than that which is actually measured, or on a process or trend that 
otherwise might not be apparent50. As well as being used in their own right, indicators 
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can be aggregated to form indices, allowing incorporation of a wider range of 
parameters. Indicators and indices are thus useful for encapsulating a complex reality in 
simple terms and permitting comparisons across space and/or time. However, they can 
necessarily only provide a snapshot in time, and thus are limited in their ability to 
represent dynamic processes of vulnerability. In order to address these limitations, all 
indicators of vulnerability should be seen as in a constant process of refinement. 
 
There have been multiple attempts at developing national level indicators and indices 
for human aspects of vulnerability, each varying in the nature of vulnerability 
addressed, the hazard involved, and the geographical region. This is particularly well 
developed for small island developing states, while a national level index has been 
created to assess cross-country variation in social vulnerability to climate change in 
Africa51. Others have taken more global approaches to assessing vulnerability and 
resilience explicitly for climate change52. Complex analyses incorporating multiple 
stressors have been carried out at the local level in various locations53. Indicators are 
also commonly used at national and regional scale to assess environmental variability 
and hotspots for food insecurity54. These indices all vary in their approach (especially 
between data-driven/inductive as opposed to theory-driven/deductive) and 
methodological choices such as means of standardization and transformation55. 
 
Humanitarian and relief communities also have well developed tools to measure, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, the impact of disasters on food security and livelihoods. 
These include food security systems including famine early warning systems (such as 
the USAID Famine Early Warning System – FEWS NET), and food insecurity and 
vulnerability information and mapping information systems (such as the IAWG-
FIVIMS and Global Information and Early Warning Service).  
 
As an alternative approach to social vulnerability, other studies have tended to prefer 
smaller-scale and more context-specific methods of assessment. Working at the local 
scale enables more comprehensive analyses of both the biophysical and social 
vulnerability to hazards. Many place-based studies of vulnerability have been carried 
out at the small scale across the world. In southern Africa, for example, most countries 
have a National Vulnerability Assessment Committee (NVAC), and there is a Regional 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC), which assess vulnerability to food 
insecurity taking into account a variety of stressors, including climate-related 
phenomena such as drought. 
 
The sustainable livelihoods framework can be used for assessing local level 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity through analysis of the status of five “capital assets” 
– financial, human, social, physical and natural56. The sustainable livelihoods 
framework arose as a holistic tool that promotes multi-dimensional understanding of the 
nature and dynamics of livelihood vulnerability. Livelihoods in this context refer not 
only to income but also the social institutions, gender relations and property rights 
necessary to support a standard of living57. Rather than assessing poverty as a static 
variable, by looking at the assets and how individuals gain access to them to make a 
living, the sustainable livelihoods framework is therefore able to give a much more 
dynamic representation of local realities, adding some depth to questions about why 
people find themselves impoverished. In doing so, the livelihoods framework has much 
in common with entitlements analysis outlined in the previous section58.  
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3. Disasters and adaptation 
 
3.1 Disaster risk management and adaptation 
 
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4)59 highlights that, even with mitigation 
policies and measures, the legacy of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions commits 
us to climate change in the future. The human impacts of climate change are not evenly 
distributed. AR4 and the Stern Review on the economics of climate change identify 
poorer developing countries as being especially vulnerable to climate change because of 
their geographic exposure, low incomes and greater reliance on climate sensitive 
sectors, particularly agriculture. This in turn poses multiple threats to economic growth, 
poverty reduction, food security, and the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals in developing countries60.  
 
In the face of these challenges, a growing body of theory and practice has developed 
around adaptation to prepare for and respond to climate change. Although there are 
multiple definitions, adaptation can is characterised as ‘the ability to respond and adjust 
to actual or potential impacts of changing climate conditions in ways that moderate 
harm or take advantage of any positive opportunities that the climate may afford’61. Put 
simply:  
 
Adaptation is about reducing the risks posed by climate change to people’s lives 
and livelihoods62.  
 
Adaptation shares much in common with disaster risk management in preventing 
harmful impacts from extreme events. One of the manifestations of climate change is a 
projected increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, which 
without reductions in vulnerability will increase the risk of disaster events. Climate 
change adds additional challenges to existing historic weather-related shocks, including 
more severe drought impacts, heat-waves, and accelerated glacier retreat, hurricane 
intensity, and sea level rise. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies notes that there has been an increase in the number of events, and a 
geometric increase in the number of people affected by hazards since the beginning of 
records in the 1960s63.  
 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters defines a disaster as:  
a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national 
or international level for external assistance, an unforeseen and often sudden event that 
causes great damage, destruction and human suffering64. 
 
Based on this definition, an event of similar magnitude in one place may translate into a 
disaster, but in another may not, depending on the capacity of the population to cope. 
An often lower capacity to cope in developing countries means that they tend to suffer 
disproportionate effects of disasters. With drought, for example, whilst only 11% of the 
people exposed to this hazard are in the developing world, they account for 53% of 
people who lose their lives65. In addition to the direct economic, physical and human 
impacts of disasters, there are also often a number of indirect effects, which may long 
outlast the duration of the hazard itself. Many countries in central America, for example, 
are still suffering the consequences of hurricanes, such as hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
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Despite some direct links between climate change and disasters – continued sea level 
rise, for example, will increase the area exposed to the risk of coastal flooding – the link 
is generally non-linear. Individual events cannot be attributed specifically to climate 
change, as they may simply form part of natural variation in climate. However, the 
increased frequency and intensity of weather-related events is representative of a 
projected trend, so links are often drawn with climate change. The European heatwave 
of 2003, repeated inland flooding in central Europe in the early 21st century, and the 
busy Atlantic hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 have all highlighted these links66.  
 
Adaptation has clear linkages to practices of disaster risk management designed to 
tackle such extreme weather events. In the context of climate change, disaster risk 
management refers to the systematic processes to lessen the impacts of climate-related 
natural hazards. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-
structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) 
adverse effects of hazards67. This has more recently been set within the broad context of 
sustainable development under the framework of disaster risk reduction (DRR), also 
known as disaster reduction (Box 2).    
 
Box 2: Fields of action in the disaster risk reduction framework68 
• Risk awareness and assessment including hazard analysis and vulnerability/capacity 
analysis;  
• Knowledge development including education, training, research and information;  
• Public commitment and institutional frameworks, including organisational, policy, legislation 
and community action;  
• Application of measures including environmental management, land-use and urban 
planning, protection of critical facilities, application of science and technology, partnership 
and networking, and financial instruments;  
• Early warning systems including forecasting, dissemination of warnings, preparedness 
measures and reaction capacities.  
 
3.2 Linking adaptation and disasters communities  
 
Although hazard links may be non-linear, there are clear inter-relationships between 
tackling climate change and disasters. Effective disaster risk management cannot take 
place without consideration of climate change, and climate change adaptation will need 
to highlight the likelihood of increased disasters. In reality, however, two distinct 
communities of researchers and practitioners have evolved, one dealing with climate 
change and the other dealing with hazards/extremes/disasters.  
 
This divergence has been attributed to (and in turn reinforced by) differing timescales 
and spatial scales of activity by the two communities69. The climate change community 
tends to focus on the longer term, making projections that last well into the 21st century 
and dealing mainly with a change in variability, whilst the disasters communities has 
typically been focused on the short term. Climate change science also works primarily 
at the global level, with models reflecting the global nature of the atmospheric and 
oceanic circulation; whilst those working in the disaster field have tended to focus more 
on the local and national level where weather extremes are manifest, perhaps 
overlooking the root causes of vulnerability at the international level. The consequences 
of these different foci have led to the development of different language and 
terminology used to refer similar concepts and phenomena, and cemented the divide. 
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There have been multiple calls for greater integration between the two communities70, 
and as both knowledge of climate change and the negative effects of disasters increase, 
there are signs that the two communities are beginning to come together. This is at least 
in part due to the realisation across both groups that they are failing to reduce the 
vulnerability of people to climate change and disasters71. Rather than trying to predict 
the future occurrences of climate change and hazards, therefore, reducing the risk from 
climate change and disasters provides a more fail-safe policy for protecting livelihoods 
and food security in the face of potential unknown hazards. A greater focus on 
vulnerability reduction through climate risk management is therefore emerging as a 
unifying concept between climate change and disaster risk management, and is 
beginning to bridge the gap72. 
 
 
3.3 Climate risk management and adaptation for food security  
 
Adaptation will be critical to reduce the projections of food insecure people under 
climate change, and also to ensure that the first Millennium Development Goal, on 
halving hunger by 2015, is met73. With regards to production, changing patterns of 
extreme events are likely to have more significant impacts than gradual temperature or 
rainfall changes. Changes to drought frequency are particularly important given their 
potential to dramatically reduce yields and livestock, especially in rainfed systems. 
Climate-related impacts also have the potential to affect other aspects of food security, 
particularly through adverse impacts on infrastructure, transport and food distribution 
systems and their infrastructure. Negative impacts may also disrupt markets by reducing 
consumer purchasing power. 
 
Commercial agriculture, for example, has a typical lag time of 15-30 years to implement 
changes in the production system; whereas an individual subsistence farmer growing an 
annual crop will have much more flexibility in changing what they grow year-on-year – 
although of course this is constrained by access to resources (inputs such as seed and 
fertiliser, and physical capital such as land and tools). One common adaptation for 
commercial farming is the use of crop and flood insurance, although there is a risk that 
such options actually increase susceptibility by providing a cushioning layer which 
prevents farmers from taking decisions to link their farming activities with the weather 
conditions74. 
 
Perhaps more important, and accessible to farmers at all levels, is the provision of 
climate information and early warning, so that they are able to make decisions that are 
appropriate to the upcoming conditions. Seasonal forecasts are commonly produced by 
national meteorological services, which model a range of climate parameters and 
provide probabilistic short term forecasts of the likelihood of rainfall being less than the 
average, average, or higher than average over the coming season. At the national level 
this information is clearly important to predict shortfalls in yields and to plan for 
potential food security crises. The increasing availability of climate information after 
the 1991/2 drought in southern Africa assisted in preparing for subsequent El Nino-
Southern Oscillation events, reducing negative impacts75.  
 
However, food insecurity is often more likely to be manifest at the sub-national level 
and so providing this information to individual farmers is important76. Simulated 
experiments with small-scale rural subsistence farmers have shown that they are able to 
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effectively use such information to adapt their farming methods and mitigate the 
adverse effects of drought77. But several studies have highlighted the importance of the 
process of transferring information from national to local level, which must be timely 
and take into account the farmers preferences in information channels and timing78 
 
3.4 Financing mechanisms for adaptation  
Adaptation remains much less developed than greenhouse gas mitigation as a policy 
response79, and there are no binding commitments on adaptation within the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. That said, article 4.1 of the convention 
states that parties should “protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. With regards to adaptation in 
particular, article 4.3 states that developed countries should meet the agreed incremental 
costs of adaptation in full; and article 4.4 commits developed countries to assisting 
developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation80. 
 
Considerable financial assistance will be required to meet needs for adaptation, with 
estimates of annual adaptation costs in developing countries estimated by various 
sources at between US$28-86 billion81. Providing such resources is likely to require an 
innovative mix of public and private finance, channelled through conventional 
development assistance routes, international financial structures, and the private sector.  
 
Throughout the course of negotiations on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol three 
major funds have been established for adaptation activities: the special climate change 
fund and least developed countries fund (under the UNFCCC), and the adaptation fund 
(under the Kyoto Protocol) (see table 3). Two of these funds are managed and 
administered by the Global Environment Facility, who have also been funding 
adaptation since 2004 under their Strategic Priority Areas. The OECD also provides 
assistance through its Disaster Assistance Committee, although this is only on an ad hoc 
basis, typically when donations have been received in the aftermath of hazards82. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the three adaptation funds under the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol83 
Source 
 
Fund name 
 
Main intended applications 
 
Special 
Climate 
Change Fund 
- to assist developing countries in diversifying their 
economies 
- preparing initial national communications 
- strengthening climate networks and the provision of 
information/capacity building/disaster preparedness 
UNFCCC 
 
 
Least 
Developed 
Countries 
Fund 
- preparing and implementing National Adaptation 
Plans of Action (NAPAs) on urgent and immediate 
adaptation needs in least developed countries 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Adaptation 
Fund 
- to finance concrete adaptation projects in developing 
countries that are party to the Kyoto Protocol 
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Over the medium to longer term there is greater potential to adapt to climate change 
through mainstreaming adaptation and risk in core development activities, relative to 
financing of adaptation through the climate regime84. If the risks of climate change are 
not considered when planning development projects and programmes, there is a chance 
that the effects of climate change may negate the positive effects of the initiatives. 
 
A number of donors, both bilateral and multilateral, have taken this onboard and now 
consider “climate proofing” or climate risk assessment of their development projects to 
ensure that such projects do not inadvertently increase vulnerability to climate change 
and extreme weather events. Such a risk management approach to integrating adaptation 
to climate variability and change is gaining momentum across a range of donors 
including the UK, Norway85, Germany86; and multilateral donors are the World Bank87. 
The OECD is currently building on previous efforts to prepare broad guidelines on how 
to screen development portfolios to assess potential for mainstreaming adaptation into 
development activities88. 
 
 
3.5 Institutions for adaptation and disaster risk reduction  
 
Vulnerability reduction and mainstreaming adaptation and risk into development 
activities are thus important policy goals for responding to climate change and disaster 
risk. But implementing these changes often requires fairly radical shifts in thinking and 
new institutional architecture89. Typically with extreme weather events the focus, 
particularly in developing countries, is on the recovery from a disaster rather than 
vulnerability reduction before the event, and this system is reinforced by the investment 
policies of donors90. This system is beginning to change with integrated disaster risk 
management and the acceptance that the timeframe of focus for risk reduction needs to 
consider pre-event vulnerability reduction, as post-event response. For this to occur, 
different institutions need to be involved at various stages91. 
 
At the national level, many countries are having to modify their disaster management 
institutions to reflect this new paradigm, or design disaster management policies and 
setting up institutions to formalize and implement such policies. In the USA disaster 
response has typically been coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management 
Association (FEMA), which was integrated into the Department of Homeland Security 
in 2001. Still, the institutional arrangements have been criticized92. Gopalakrishnan and 
Okada outline 8 characteristics that they believe are necessary for institutions 
implementing disaster risk management to have: awareness/access, autonomy (in that 
the institution must have the authority to act in the case of a disaster/state of emergency 
being declared), affordability, accountability, adaptability (to take into account cultural 
norms as well as the nature of the risk), efficiency (how well they do all of the above), 
equity and sustainability. 
 
Whilst the reorientation of existing disaster management frameworks can be 
problematic, even countries introducing disaster management policies and institutions 
from scratch can come up against barriers. The information available with regard to 
climate change and disasters is increasing through vulnerability and risk assessments, 
and having this information has been shown to be correlated with the number of lives 
saved and general quality of response after a disaster93. Information sharing is 
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dependent on understanding of the importance of that information, knowing to whom to 
disseminate it, and how. Individuals act as key hubs within a network, and thus play a 
large gate-keeping role.  
 
The multisectoral nature of climate change and disasters means that effective 
implementation can only be achieved when disaster management institutions are 
integrated with other relevant government institutions at all levels of administration 
within a country, and for this to occur, it often means that people are charged with 
disaster management responsibilities even if it is not their core area of competency or 
focus of work. A study comparing disaster management in Italy and the USA showed 
that very few public servants working in the field of disaster management had a 
background in the topic and this, together with the norms of professional culture, forms 
a key control over how information is disseminated, shared and used94. 
 
As well as including administrative structures, it is also important to create institutional 
frameworks that allow for participation of other relevant stakeholders. NGOs, for 
example, have a long history of providing emergency humanitarian assistance after 
disasters, and longer term reconstruction. They are arguably suited, and indeed often 
have a comparable advantage in this role, due to their location on the ground and 
understanding of local context and conditions. Although they may have a tendency to 
compete with each other for “worldview” space, reflecting their different ideologies and 
sympathies, there is plentiful evidence of effective NGO coordination in response to 
disaster such as the Asian tsunami95 and Mozambique floods, where over 49 countries 
and 30 international NGOs provided assistance which then had to be coordinated on the 
ground96. 
 
Box 3: Case study disaster management - South Africa 
South Africa has actively embraced the change in paradigm from disaster response to 
longer term integrated disaster risk management. The recent introduction of legislation 
and a new policy framework now means that, at least on paper, South Africa has one 
of the most advanced institutional frameworks for disaster management in the world97. 
The process of policy formation began in the late 1990s, with legislation being 
promulgated in 2002 – the Disaster Management Act no 57 of 200298. This came into 
force in 2003, and since then has progressively been introduced at the different levels 
of political administration (provincial, district municipality and municipality), ending 
with municipality in 2004. Whilst political responsibility is assumed by existing 
figures, in order to implement the new legislation and policies, a new institutional 
structure had to be created. Advisory fora are multi-stakeholder institutions in an 
attempt to improve integration between disaster management and other policy arenas, 
whilst a number of civil servant positions with explicit responsibility for disaster 
management have been created.  
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4. Food security in a changing climate: Issues for FAO consideration 
 
The implications of climate change and a potentially increasing disaster burden provide 
FAO with the challenge of determining what assistance it can provide to member states 
to maintain and improve food security under changing climatic conditions, and how it 
can link with other institutions to promote vulnerability reduction/disaster risk 
reduction. These issues will be drawn out in greater depth at the expert meeting. In 
order to stimulate discussion, some of the potential options for FAO engagement on 
food security, adaptation and disasters are outlined below, highlighting measures that 
might be taken the address issues relevant to the short, medium and long term. This 
refers to the timescale over which the issue is likely to assume greater importance rather 
than representing a prioritisation for FAO action. A summary (Table 4) follows short 
descriptions of the suggested issues.   
 
4.1 Short term issues  
 
In the short term, the ongoing occurrence of frequent disaster events demonstrates the 
need for redoubled efforts to protect agricultural production against extreme weather 
events and climate variability. There is already evidence that climate variability and 
extremes are increasing in many areas, pushing the capacities of existing agricultural 
and food systems.  To understand how these issues of environmental change interact 
with other economic/market and political driving forces to affect food security suggests 
the use of a livelihoods lens, as already being advocated by the Household Food 
Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods section of the Nutrition and Consumer Protection 
Division. 
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Measures to address enhanced climate variability include improvements to disaster risk 
reduction and seasonal forecasting to enable more effective climate risk management99.  
Coping with climate shocks and stresses also entail greater attention to the emerging 
range of social protection measures related to agricultural production. These include 
weather-based crop insurance, asset restocking, starter packs and seed fairs, and cash 
transfers100. Changing environmental conditions are already necessitating greater 
transfers of agricultural practices and technologies.  
 
Research and information will need to be enhanced to prepare for climate change 
impacts on crops and agricultural systems. This analysis may include the impact of the 
growing demand for biofuel crops. Research into the specific impacts of climate change 
on productivity is already being provided by several units within FAO: for example the 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Economics and Policy Division (FIE), Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department is looking at the impact on fisheries, and the Plant Production 
and Protection Division, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department is 
investigating the impacts on seed security. Additionally, the new Climate Change and 
Bioenergy Unit in the Environment Climate Change and Bioenergy Division is 
developing a climate impact assessment tool for crop production. FAO also has a long 
history of involvement in agricultural risk management (through the Policy Assistance 
Division of the Technical Cooperation Department), primarily from an 
asset/market/production perspective (credit risk) – but there is scope to include climate 
change and disaster risk management as causes of production and asset risk, which can 
in turn be communicated to farmers. 
 
Improved understanding of user needs for climate and vulnerability information will be 
central to strengthening capacity of food security systems to adapt to change. As 
international financial and technical flows for adaptation grow, there is a requirement to 
strengthen capacity of agriculture sector institutions to access these resources. The 
Global Information and Early Warning Service, Trade and Markets Division of the 
Economic and Social Development Department in FAO, for example, are already 
modelling crop prospects and pests and could include climate early warning information 
into its assessments.  The Climate Change and Bioenergy Division is also drawing 
together information on evidence for local level adaptation, which will assist in 
highlighting where further information is needed at the grassroots level. 
 
The rising burden of extreme events and climate change will require FAO to enhance 
their partnerships with international and national institutions working on broader aspects 
affecting vulnerability and food security outside food availability alone. National and 
international research links to put transfers and emerging technologies into practice will 
need to be combined with strengthening of national institutional capacity for long term 
agricultural planning and agricultural extension. Finally, with the potential for acute 
food shortages to become chronic deficits, agricultural analysis to improve the 
integration of long term perspectives within emergency food bodies such as WFP.  
 
4.2 Medium term issues  
 
Greater attention will be required in the medium term to the gradual shifts and new 
hazards associated with climate change. Water planning and increased irrigation is 
likely to be required for areas that currently depend on rain-fed agriculture if long term 
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viability of agriculture is to be ensured, coupled with development and dissemination of 
crop varieties and practices suited to changing climatic conditions.  
 
Existing social protection may be challenged by changing frequency and magnitudes of 
hazards and more widespread insurance mechanisms may be required to cope with 
shocks and stresses to agricultural systems. There is presently little understanding of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of adaptive measures, including social protection over time 
with projected climate changes. Equally, there is limited understanding of the actual and 
potential impact of climate change on world food prices, linked to both climate shocks 
and to the evolving markets for both biofuels and biomass for carbon sequestration.  
 
 
4.3 Long term issues  
 
In the longer-term, as the configuration of arable land availability changes, both 
globally and within countries, it might be appropriate and necessary to think in terms of 
facilitating the movement of people out of areas that are in agro-ecological decline, to 
areas with higher (ideally rising) agricultural potential. In very large countries like 
China, India and Brazil, this population movement might be manageable within national 
borders: farmers would move from one province or state to another. At the global level, 
if it is true that countries like Chad, Niger and Zambia will lose large proportions of 
their farmland during this century, then the challenge is to generate alternative 
livelihoods that are not climate-sensitive for millions of farmers, within the next 2-3 
generations at the latest – which implies pursuing a very different development strategy 
to investing in agriculture, including investing heavily in education of rural populations. 
Most livelihoods that are not climate-sensitive require a literate and well-educated 
workforce. 
 
The challenge of finding alternative livelihoods to smallholder farming in agriculture-
based societies has been successfully negotiated across the world – in Europe over a 
century ago, more recently in the ‘Asian tiger’ economies, and is currently occurring in 
India and Bangladesh. In much of Africa the problem of how to achieve a structural 
transformation of the economy away from small farm agriculture seems intractable, but 
is rapidly becoming a strategic imperative, driven by erratic weather and the specific 
threat that climate change poses to food production in Africa. 
 
A more radical scenario would envisage large-scale international migration of small 
farmers from adversely affected countries (say, Chad or highland Ethiopia) to newly 
available arable lands (say, in Siberia or northern Canada). While this option might 
seem highly unlikely right now, evolving population dynamics (high-income countries 
with low population growth might lack the workforce to farm all their newly available 
arable land) and rising global food insecurity (putting intolerable demands on the 
international humanitarian system) could make it more feasible in decades to come.  
The potential for such issues to arise makes it imperative to strengthen institutional links 
with existing partners, such as FAO; but also to forge new partnerships with other 
relevant international organisations, such as the UNHCR and IOM. 
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Table 4: Summary of suggested issues for FAO consideration 
 
 Short term  Medium term Long term 
Implementation  Disaster risk reduction 
measures 
Social protection targeting 
climate shocks 
Agriculture technology to 
improve coping  
Water saving and irrigation 
systems to cope with 
increased climate variability  
Enhance focus on non 
availability aspects of food 
security  
Agriculture technology for 
adaptation, including 
development / dissemination of 
new crop varieties / practices  
Water planning and irrigation 
practices  
Widespread weather-linked 
insurance mechanisms  
Livelihood diversification out 
of more climate sensitive 
activities, including farming 
Assisted migration schemes 
Facilitating expansion of 
agriculture into more 
favourable areas 
Research and 
information  
Climate change impacts data 
on crops and systems  
Linking food security and 
biofuel production 
Strengthening capacity of 
agriculture sector institutions 
to access available 
adaptation financial flows  
Building adaptive capacity of 
agriculture systems to cope 
with long term change 
Assessing user needs for 
climate vulnerability data 
Effectiveness and economic 
efficiency of adaptive 
measures, including social 
protection, over time 
Burden of costs of adaptation  
Impacts of climate change on 
rising food prices 
 
Analysis and preparedness 
for areas of more favourable 
agriculture conditions  
Financial Systems for 
resource transfer  
Possible entrenchment of 
chronic food deficits – 
consequent supply issues, 
security issues and migratory 
flows  
 
Institutions 
and 
partnerships 
Partnerships to work on aspects of vulnerability to food security 
beyond availability 
Linkages with CGIAR bodies on agriculture practices and 
technology  
Strengthening national institutional capacity for long term 
agricultural planning and agricultural extension (including links to 
disaster infrastructure) 
Links with emergency food bodies including WFP to integrate 
long term perspectives on chronic food shortages  
Potential international 
architecture for regulating 
food security for entrenched  
chronic food deficits  
Conflict, security, emergency,  
and migration partnerships 
(IOM, UNHCR, WFP) 
Links to trade bodies  
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